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Model-based evaluation of major accident consequences and effects occurring 
during the transport of dangerous substances presents a great interest, because it allows 
derivation of relevant conclusions on the cause-effect close relationship. Such a numeri-
cal (in-silico) analysis helps to improve safety regulations for the transport of hazardous 
substances aimed at preventing dramatic accidents causing many deaths, injuries, and 
structural damage. By using the standard TNT equivalency math model, coupled with the 
Probit functions technique, the consequences and effects of an accidental blast have been 
estimated.1,2 The approached case study here refers to the accidental explosion of a truck 
while transporting 20 t of ammonium nitrate (AN) in the proximity of Mihăileşti village 
(Romania) on 24 May 2004. The model-based simulated accident consequences and ef-
fects match the data taken on the spot after the accident. Multiple simulations lead to 
deriving relevant conclusions of practiced value for improving the transport safety of 
hazardous substances.
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Introduction
Ammonium nitrate (AN) is a substance of high 
interest due to its multiple applications, being cur-
rently produced in large quantities on an industrial 
scale (6.61 million tonnes in 2018).3 AN is widely 
used in the chemical industry, agriculture (fertilizer), 
as an explosive, or as a potential ingredient of solid 
propellants in space and military missions.4
Although it acts as a source of ammonia and 
nitrate ion vital to plants in the form of nitrogen 
fertilizer, in explosives and propellants, the nitrate 
ion is a source of oxygen and its application is as an 
oxidizer.
Due to its composition and properties (see fur-
ther), AN is the principal component of most indus-
trial explosives. Several compositions of AN, such 
as ammonium nitrate–fuel oil (ANFO), amatol, etc., 
are well-known explosives.4 “However, its use in 
the field of propellants / pyrotechnics, unlike potas-
sium nitrate, which is the principal constituent of 
black powder or gun powder and was used in the 
earliest solid rockets, or ammonium perchlorate 
(AP), which is the main oxidizer of modern solid 
propellants, is rather limited. Its principal use in 
pro pellants is restricted to its low-burning-rate, 
low-performance applications, such as gas genera-
tors for turbo-pumps of liquid propellant rocket en-
gines or emergency starters for jet aircraft”.4
Accidental explosions of large AN amounts 
have been proved to be catastrophic (see Table 1, 
and reviews5,6).
If such an explosion takes place in the proxim-
ity of a (petro-)chemical plant / unit, then more dra-
matic consequences may occur through the so-
called Domino effect.1,7,11,14
The Mihăileşti accident
On May 24, 2004 (4:57 AM), a truck loaded 
with 20 t of AN rolled over and caught fire before 
exploding an hour later, killing 20 people and injur-
ing 13 others, on the European road E-85 in the 
proximity of Mihăileşti village (Buzău county, Ro-
mania).8 The truck was loaded with AN in the form 
of (porous) granules, partly put in bags, and partly 
in bulk (which was illegal). Accident investigators 
advanced the idea that after the accident, the truck 
entered a ditch and tilted at 45o, so that the fuel tank *Corresponding author, e-mail address: gmaria99m@hotmail.com
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rubbed the ground and hit a bridge head, and thus 
breaking. A short circuit in the truck’s battery may 
have ignited the truck’s plastic wrap. The plastic 
that caught fire could have ignited the driver’s cab-
in, and the fuel spilled from the truck’s tank, caus-
ing the AN explosion.19
The casualties included: the driver, 7 fire-fight-
ers from two fire-trucks that had arrived at the scene 
20 minutes later, 2 members of a TV-crew quickly 
that had arrived at the accident scene to film the fire 
for a TV-News-channel, and several curious villag-
ers gathered around the accident site. After the truck 
had caught fire, the gasoline leaked from the broken 
tank, thus reaching the AN load of the overturned 
truck. One hour after the accident (at 5:47 AM) a 
small explosion took place in the cabin of the truck, 
followed 2 minutes later by a major explosion (Fig. 
1a-b), killing 20 people, and injuring 13 others in a 
radius of ca. 30 m.8,19
Out of the 20 fatalities, 2 people had to be 
identified by means of DNA testing. The explosion 
left behind a 6.5 meter deep crater (Fig. 1a), scat-
tered human remains and debris over a radius of 
several tens of meters, and caused material damage 
amounting to more than 100 000 (€).
Following this event, safety regulations in Ro-
mania for the transport of hazardous chemical sub-
stances were improved, and AN was classified as a 
hazardous chemical compound. Several managers 
from two companies involved in the transport of 
AN without safety measures were charged with ho-
micide by negligence and destruction of property. 
All were found guilty and sentenced to jail as well 
as the payment of compensation to the victims’ 
families. More details can be found in the media of 
that time.8
Due to its hazardous properties (discussed fur-
ther herein), AN is difficult to transport and store in 
perfect safety. This explains the large number of ac-
cidents involving AN. Some of them are presented 
in Table 1, and in a review.5
The aim of this paper was to simulate, using a 
standard math model from the literature, this AN 
truck accident / explosion which took place at Mi-
hăileşti in 2004. The results of multiple simulations 
were compared with the accident scene data, and 
used to derive some useful conclusions and sugges-
tions concerning safety measures to be taken during 
long-distance road transport of AN worldwide.
AN properties
AN is a substance with NH4NO3 formula. It is 
a crystalline colorless salt, highly soluble in water. 
Although it is hygroscopic, it does not form hy-
drates. It is also soluble in alcohol, acetic acid, and 
nitric acid. AN dissolves in liquid ammonia to form 
what is known as Divers’ solution, and can be used 
to strip ammonia from gases. AN has a negative 
heat of solution in water, and can therefore be used 
to prepare freezing mixtures. The chemical reactivi-
ty of AN has been well documented in literature.9 
The boiling point of the pure material is around 
210 °C at 11 mmHg, and it distills without decompo-
sition. “It decomposes around 230 ºC at 760 mmHg, 
and above 325 °C it deflagrates. If confined, AN 
may explode between 260 and 300 °C.” 4,6,17 Data on 
Ta b l e  1  – Some of the major accidents caused by AN explosions5,6
Location Year Deaths (injuries)
AN mass  
(t) Remarks
Faversham, UK 1916 115 700 Fire in a factory
Oppau, Germany 1921 561 (2000) 450 BASF plant
Tessenderlo, Belgium 1942 189 (900) 150 An attempt to disaggregate a pile
Texas city, USA 1947 581 2086+870 AN loaded in a cargo ship
Roseburg, USA 1959 14 4.1 A truck carrying dynamite and AN
Oulu, Finland 1963 10 10 A plant in the Typpi Oy industrial site
Taroom, Australia 1972 3 12 A truck carrying AN
Kansas city, USA 1988 6 23 Two trailers carrying AN and fuel oil (ANFO)
Xingping, China 1998 22 27.6 To a plant of Xinghua Fertilizer company 
Toulouse, France 2001 31 200–300 In a warehouse of AZF Co., where the granular AN was stored
Mihailesti, Romania 2004 20 (13) 20 A truck carrying AN 
West, TX, USA 2013 15 240 A fire in a fertilizer company
Tianjib port, China 2015 173 800 In a warehouse where the granular AN was stored
Beirut 2020 203 (6500) 2,750 AN stored in Port in an abandoned ship
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solubility, vapor pressure, boiling point, specific 
heat of aqueous AN solutions, and many other prop-
erties, especially those relevant to its use as a compo-
nent of explosive mixtures, are well documented.4
AN has attracted the attention of researchers in 
different disciplines due to some of its interesting 
properties.4
Firstly, the intrinsic phase transitions of this 
solid have been studied in the field of solid-state 
physics in order to examine the details of such trans-
 formations. The phase transitions of the solid state 
takes place near ambient temperatures (20–30 °C) 
contributing to its agglomeration (an unwanted phe-
nomenon). Some properties of AN are displayed in 
Table 2. The transition between the five (I-V) dif-
ferent phases of AN has important consequences on 
practical applications. Thus, it was observed that AN 
composite propellant grain cracks on storage at room 
temperature due to IV-to-III transition (32–85 °C).4
While being stable in the lower temperature 
range, however, when heated above 190 °C (e.g., by 
gasoline fire, as in the present case study) auto-ig-
nition and explosion may take place,6 due to the cat-
alytic effects of the impurity on the decomposition 
of AN. Technical grade AN is always impure, be-
cause in the process of its manufacture, storage, 
transport, and use, AN is often contaminated by im-
purities, such as inorganic acid, organic oil, and 
others.15
AN is an hazardous substance mainly because 
its decomposition (following a complex mecha-
nism) leads to a large amount of gases in a very 
short time (ms). The ANFO (AN mixed with fuel 
oil) combustion and self-sustained decomposition 
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where “CH2[hydroc.]” denotes fragments of hydro-
carbons.6
The AN self-sustained thermal decomposition 
follows a complex reaction mechanism.6 When 







4 3 2 2
–1
4 3 2 2
–1
4 3 2 2 2
NH NO     N O + 2 H O  + 59 kJ mol
NH NO     0.5 N  + NO + 2 H O + 257 kJ mol




If AN is suddenly heated up at temperatures 
higher than 170 °C, there will be explosive decom-
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Due to the aforementioned reasons, AN is diffi-
cult to transport and store in perfect safety. This ex-
plains the large number of accidents involving AN 
(see Table 1, and review5).
TNT equivalency model
As mentioned previously, once the temperature 
exceeds 170 °C, and reaches 230 °C, due to the fuel 
/ plastics fire (in the present case), AN decomposi-
tion starts and, above 325 °C, it detonates.4,6,17
To simulate an AN explosion, the TNT model 
has successfully been used as reported in the litera-
ture, e.g., to simulate the Beirut AN catastrophic 
explosion,10 or to evaluate the safety distance in 
land use planning.17
The basic model
When a large amount of a flammable liquid, or 
a substance likely to decompose rapidly, a vapour 
cloud forms and disperses with the surrounding air. 
In the present case study, AN was rapidly heated by 
the fuel fire which happened in the same place. If 
the cloud is ignited / detonated before the cloud is 
diluted below its lower flammability limit (LFL), or 
its lower detonation limit (LDL) respectively, a 
VCE (vapour cloud explosion) will occur.1 To sim-
ulate a VCE, several mathematical models can be 
applied, i.e.: i) TNT equivalency model;1 ii) TNO 
multi-energy model,1,16 and iii) modified Baker 
model.1
Ta b l e  2  – Some properties of AN. Collected data.4,6
Property Value
Molecular weight 80 kg kmol–1
Heat of combustion 1,447.7 kJ kg–1
Heat of combustion of ANFO(*) 4,017 kJ kg–1
Heat of formation 4,594 kJ kg–1
Heat of explosion 1,447.7 kJ kg–1
Heat of fusion 76.7 kJ kg–1
Density 1,725 kg m–3
Melting point 169.6 °C
Solubility in water at 20 °C 66 g, at 100 g
Oxygen content 60 %
Flame temperature 1,500 °C
Detonation velocity 1,250–4,650 m s–1
Specific heat from 0 to 31 °C 1.72 kJ kmol–1
Vapor pressure at 205 °C 7.4 mmHg
(*) Notation ANFO refers to AN mixed with fuel oil.
.
.
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In the present study, the TNT equivalency mod-
el was applied, as being more intuitive, sufficiently 
accurate, and more often used to simulate AN ex-
plosions of different sizes.10,17
The TNT model includes three main computa-
tional steps (Steps 1–3 presented in Table 3). The 
basic idea of the model was to estimate the amount 
of TNT (denoted by “W”) which, by exploding, pro-
duces blast consequences equivalent to those pro-
duced by the explosion of the analysed substance 
quantity. Based on the equivalent “W” (computed 
with the relationship in Table 3), the model was 
then able to estimate the blast parameter vector f = 
[p0, ip, td, ta] (defined in the notation list), for a 
given distance “R” from the explosion centre, by 
using a couple of algebraic empirical functions, in 
the following form:
 
( ) ( )( )n10 10i=0log   +  log
i
ic a b Zf = ⋅∑  (1)
In Eq. (1), the scaled distance “Z” defined for a 
given distance R from the explosion centre to a de-






The empirical coefficients [a, b, c(i)] for the 
blast parameter functions in (1) are given in Table 4.
Once the overpressure “p0” was evaluated, it 
was possible to estimate the explosion damages (ef-
fects), expressed in both human losses (P% fatali-
ties), and P% structural losses, by using the Probit 
functions method. Based on the blast overpressure 
dose (p0) received by a receptor located at a defined 
distance “R”, a Probit variable (Y) was evaluated 
using the empirical relationships of Step 4 displayed 
in Table 3. Irrespectively of the accident type (toxic 
dose, overpressure dose, or thermal radiation dose), 
the Probit variable (Y) is related to the probability 
or percentage of affected receptors (P%) by the re-
lationship defined in Step 5 of Table 3. More details 
on the Probit functions method can be found in the 
literature.1 More specific damages for common 
structures due to the blast overpressure are given in 
Table 6.
Model implementation and preliminary checks
The TNT model is part of a large number of 
commercial software (see the literature re-
views).2,12,13 Instead, a “home-made” routine includ-
ing the TNT model was developed using the Mat-
lab™ package facilities. To validate our software, 
two solved case studies exemplifying the TNT 
model have been used (i.e., those of pp. 174–176 of 
a reference book from literature).1 Based on the 
positive validation / check of our routine, we con-
cluded that our developed Matlab™ code to simu-
late VCE-s using the standard TNT model, proved 
to be satisfactorily accurate. Consequently, this cod-
ed TNT model has been used to solve the ap-
proached case study, by in-silico (model-based) es-
timation of the Mihăileşti accident consequences / 
Ta b l e  3 	–	The	TNT	equivalency	model	to	estimate	the	consequences	of	an	explosion.	The	TNT	model	was	completed	with	the	Probit	
model to estimate the probability (percentage) of affected receptors (humans or structures).1













Step 3. Evaluate the blast parameters, vector f = [p0, ip, td, ta], with the following empirical functions:
( ) ( )( )n10 10i=0log   +  log
i
c a b Zif = ⋅∑
Where the coefficients [a, b, c(i)] for the blast parameter functions are given in Table 4.
Step 4. Evaluate the Probit variable (Y) using the following recommended empirical relationships:
Y = –77.1 + 6.91 · ln (p0), for human receptors
Y = –23.8 + 2.92 · ln (p0), for structures (buildings, industrial plants, etc.)
Step 5. Evaluate the probability or percentage of affected receptors at a given distance R, using the Probit variable (Y), with the 
recommended relationship:
 – 5 – 5
50 1 +  erf








, (also denoted as P%). 
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Valid for 0.0674 ≤ Z ≤ 40
Lg(p0) = 2.7807 –1.6958 · ABP –0.1541 · ABP2 + 0.5140 · ABP3 +
0.0988 · ABP4 –0.2939 · ABP5 –0.0268 · ABP6 + 0.1090 · ABP7 +
0.0016 · ABP8 –0.0214 · ABP9 + 0.0001 · ABP10 + 0.0016 · ABP11;
Where ABP = (–0.2143 + 1.3503 lg(Z))
ip(1)
Valid for 0.0674 ≤ Z ≤ 0.955
Lg(ip) = 2.5245 –0.5029 · ABIP + 0.1713 · ABIP2 +
0.0450 · ABIP3 –0.0118 · ABIP4 –0.0066 · ABIP5 +
–0.0028 · ABIP6 + 0.0013 · ABIP7;
Where ABIP = (2.0676 + 3.0760 lg(Z)) 
ip(2)
Valid for 0.955 ≤ Z ≤ 40
Lg(ip) = 1.6728 –0.3845 · ABIP –0.0260 · ABIP2 +
0.0059 · ABIP3 + 0.0145 · ABIP4 –0.0066 · ABIP5 +
–0.0028 · ABIP6 + 0.0013 · ABIP7;
Where ABIP = (–1.9470 + 2.4069 lg(Z))
td(1)
Valid for 0.178 ≤ Z ≤ 1.01
Lg(td) = –0.6142 + 0.1301 · ABTD + 0.1348 · ABTD2 +
0.0391 · ABTD3 –0.0047 · ABTD4 –0.0042 · ABTD5 +
0.0056 · ABTD6 + 0.0001 · ABTD7 –0.0006 · ABTD8;
Where ABTD = (1.9294 + 5.2509 lg(Z))
td(2)
Valid for 1.01 ≤ Z ≤ 2.78
Lg(td) = 0.3154 –0.0297 · ABTD + 0.0306 · ABTD2 +
0.0183 · ABTD3 –0.0173 · ABTD4 –0.0010 · ABTD5 +
0.0056 · ABTD6 + 0.0001 · ABTD7 –0.0006 · ABTD8;
Where ABTD = (–2.1249 + 9.2996 lg(Z))
td(3)
Valid for 2.78 ≤ Z ≤ 40
Lg(td) = 0.6869 + 0.0933 · ABTD –0.0005 · ABTD2 +
–0.0022 · ABTD3 –0.0029 · ABTD4 + 0.0014 · ABTD5 +
0.0056 · ABTD6 + 0.0001 · ABTD7 –0.0006 · ABTD8;
Where ABTD = (–3.5362 + 3.4634 lg(Z))
ta
Valid for 0.0674 ≤ Z ≤ 40
Lg(ta) = –0.0591 + 1.3570 · ABTA + 0.0524 · ABTA2 +
–0.1965 · ABTA3 + –0.0601 · ABTA4 + 0.0696 · ABTA5 +
0.0216 · ABTA6 –0.0161 · ABTA7 +
–0.0023 · ABTA8 + 0.0014 · ABTA9;
Where ABTA = (–0.2024 + 1.3778 lg(Z))
Ta b l e  5 	–	Simulated	Mihăileşti	case	study	input	data
Parameter Value Remarks
Ammonium nitrate mass M = 20 t Mihăileşti (Romania) accident5,8
Analysed surface radius around the explosion R = 150 m adopted
Unitless empirical explosion efficiency h = 0.05 recommended1,17
Heat of combustion NH4NO3 EC = 1447.7 kJ kg
–1 from4 
Heat of combustion of TNT ETNT = 4652 kJ kg
–1 (i.e. 2000 Btu lb–1) from1
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effects, to eventually predict / recommend safety 
requirements when transporting large amounts of 
AN by truck over long distances. Damages due to 
truck fragments18 were not considered in our nu-
merical analysis.
Simulation of explosion consequences and effects
Mihăileşti accident (20 t. AN blast)
By using the here presented TNT math model, 
Tables 3–4, and the input data in Table 5, the Mi-
hăileşti AN blast consequences and effects were 
simulated. The results are presented in Figs. 2–4. 
The analysis of the obtained blast parameters led to 
the following conclusions:
i.- P% fatalities of humans and structures are 
practically 100 % within a radius of 30 m around 
the explosion centre, Fig. 2 and Fig. 4, but negligi-
ble (or much smaller) outside this area. Human P% 
fatalities are negligible outside an area of a 30 m 
radius, while P% structure fatalities are negligible 
outside an area of a 50 m radius according to the 
plot in Fig. 2. Such a result is in complete agree-
ment with the data collected from the accident site 
(Fig. 1a).
ii.- The overpressure displayed in Fig. 3 indi-
cates high values up to 570 atm inside the circle of 
30 m radius, i.e., in the area where the blast crater 
formed, and where the truck, and adjacent cars were 
destroyed and scattered in pieces (see Fig. 1a), and 
where 100 % human fatalities had been reported. 
Such a result is also in agreement with the conse-
quences predicted by Table 6 for the structural dam-
age produced by the overpressure.





0.0014 0.14 Annoying noise (137 dB if of low frequency 10–15 Hz)
0.0021 0.21 Occasional breaking of large glass windows
0.0028 0.28 Loud noise (143 dB), sonic boom, glass failure
0.0069 0.69 Breakage of small windows under strain
0.01 1.03 Typical pressure for glass breakage
0.02 2.07 “Safe distance” (probability 0.95 of no serious damage below this value); projectile limit; damage to house ceiling; 10 % window glass broken
0.027 2.76 Limited minor structural damage
0.033–0.068 3.4–6.9 Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window frames
0.047 4.8 Minor damage to house structures
0.068 6.9 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
0.068–0.136 6.9–13.8 Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated steel or aluminium panels, fastenings fail, followed by buckling; wood panels (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in
0.088 9.0 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
0.136–0.204 13.8–20.7 Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, shattered 
0.156 15.8 Lower limit of serious structural damage
0.17 17.2 50 % destruction of brickwork of houses
0.204 20.7 Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building suffered little damage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations
0.204–0.272 20.7–27.6 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks; cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured
0.34–0.475 34.5–48.2 Almost complete destruction of houses; loaded train wagons overturned
0.475–0.543 48.2–55.1 Brick panels, 8–12 inches thick, not reinforced fail by shearing or flexure
0.612 62.0 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
0.68 68.9 Probable total demolition of buildings; heavy machine tools (7000 lb) moved and badly damaged; very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survive
20.41 2068 Limit of crater lip
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iii.- The blast wave arrival time is very short 
(up to 50 ms, in Fig. 2), in the analysed area of a 
150 m radius. By contrast, the overpressure dura-
tion time is high (ca. 0.5 s, in Fig. 2) in a small area 
(below 10 m) around the explosion centre.
iv.- TNT model predictions for this case (20 t 
AN blast) corresponds to an equivalent W = 0.35 t 
TNT blast, meaning a considerable amount.
Detect the AN truck load that can improve the 
transport safety
Such major and tragic consequences/effects of 
the AN blast when large quantities are transported 
by truck, require a supplementary model-based 
analysis to detect the larger amount of AN which 
can be transported by truck to fulfil two require-
ments:
F i g .  2 	–	 The	blast	parameters	[p0,	ip,	td,	ta],	and	the	P%	fatalities	for	humans	
and	 structures	 at	 various	 distances	 from	 the	 explosion	 centre	 (case	 of	 20	 t	AN	
explosion)
F i g .  3 	–	 Overpressure	 at	 various	 distances	 from	 the	 explo-
sion spot. Note: The circles of iso-parameters present the fol-
lowings	rays:	50	m,	100	m,	and	150	m,	respectively	(case	of	20	
t AN explosion)
F i g .  4 	–	 P%	 fatalities	 of	 structures	 (buildings,	 industrial	
plants)	at	various	distances	(50	m,	100	m,	and	150	m)	from	the	
explosion spot (case of 20 t AN explosion)
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(A) It is sufficiently large for an economical 
transport, and
(B) It is sufficiently small to improve transport 
safety. In other words, in the case of an accidental 
explosion, small (limited) consequences to occur.
There are different measures to express trans-
port safety. In the present study, we chose a certain 
upper limit of P% system fatalities. That was be-
cause simulations using a wide range of AN-
amounts (1 to 20 t, not presented here) indicated the 
area of 50 m radius around the explosion location as 
being the place where maximum damage occurs. In 
all tested cases, the human P% fatalities were prac-
tically negligible outside an area of a 30 m radius.
These AN explosion repeated simulations with 
varying the AN quantity, indicated the best compro-
mise between the two criteria (A-B). The best result 
was found for a 5-t AN truck load. Truck loads 
smaller than 5 t were considered non-economic, 
while truck loads larger than 20 t lack safety re-
quirements. Thus, in the case of AN explosion, such 
an accident is expected to produce even more cata-
strophic consequences compared to those of Mi-
hăileşti. Simulated consequences of a hypothetical 
explosion of a 5 t AN load are presented in Figs. 
5–6). This truckload quantity seems to be the best 
choice, because: (a) it is reasonably large for an 
economical transport, and (b) if an accident occurs, 
its consequences would be significant, but less trag-
ic compared to those of a 20-t AN blast.
Thus, the results obtained by simulating a 5 t 
AN load hypothetical explosion, led to the follow-
ing conclusions:
a) P% fatalities of humans / structures are practi-
cally 100 % within a smaller radius of 15 m/20–30 m, 
(Fig. 5), for the 5 t exploded AN compared to 25 
m/50 m in the Mihăileşti accident (20 t exploded 
AN), but negligible outside this area. Such a con-
clusion concerning the “critical” AN mass is 
strengthened by Fig. 7 that illustrates the depen-
dence of P% fatalities of structures (buildings, adja-
cent cars, etc.) on the exploded mass of AN, at the 
same distance of 30 m from the explosion source. It 
clearly appears that explosions of AN amounts larg-
er than 5 t lead to practically total destruction of 
structures located in the vicinity of the explosion.
b) The overpressure (not displayed here in cir-
cular plots, but only in Fig. 5) indicates a high value 
of 198 atm (at the explosion centre), which gradually 
decreases inside a circle of 15 m radius until an 
overpressure of 0.24 atm (at 30 m), i.e., in the area 
where the blast crater will be formed and where the 
truck will be destroyed, as predicted by the data dis-
played in Table 6. Outside the circular area of 30 m 
radius, the overpressure is small (below 0.1 atm).
c) The blast wave arrival time is very short (up 
to 20 ms, in Fig. 5), in a circular area of 50 m radi-
us. By contrast, the overpressure duration time is 
much smaller (less than 5 ms in Fig. 5 compared to 
0.5 s in the case of a 20 t AN blast) in a small area 
(below 10–20 m) around the explosion centre.
F i g .  5 	–	 Blast	parameters	and	P%	fatalities	for	humans	and	structures	at	various	dis-
tances from the explosion location (case of 5 t AN explosion)
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d) It is understood that truck transport of an AN 
quantity in the range of 5 t-20 t (the analysed limits) 
will produce, in the case of an undesirable accident, 
much worse consequences /effects than those pro-
duced by a 5 t case, even if not as serious as for the 
20 t explosion. Consequently, it seems that a 5 t AN 
truck transport is the best choice for both economic 
and safety reasons.
e) TNT model predictions for this case (5 t AN 
blast) corresponds to an equivalent of W = 0.09 t 
TNT blast, which is roughly 4x lower than the case 
of the exploded fully loaded 20 t AN truck, with 
corresponding much diminished negative conse-
quences.
Conclusions
This study presents an in-silico (math mod-
el-based) method for rapidly determining the blast 
consequences and effects in a reasonable prediction 
area around the location where a truck loaded with 
AN accidentally caught fire and exploded. The ap-
proached case study (Mihăileşti accident, Romania, 
2004) allowed checking and validating the model 
predictions by comparing the simulated results with 
the data collected from the accident site after the 
explosion.
Here, the extracted simulation data, such as 
time of arrival, duration time, overpressure, and P% 
human and system fatalities, correlated with the dis-
tance from the explosion center (20 t of AN), shows 
a clear trend, being well represented by the estab-
lished semi-empirical TNT model predictions for an 
equivalent 350 kg TNT blast. The TNT model pre-
dictions fit very well the data collected from the ac-
cident site, in terms of arrival time, duration, and 
P% fatalities.
In order to account for the uncertainties associ-
ated with determining precise locations and timings, 
the results have also been analyzed by taking a rea-
sonable range of 5–20 t AN, and a maximum 
 distance of 150 m from the explosion center. The 
lower limit for the truckload (5 t AN) was well rep-
resented by semi-empirical predictions for an equiv-
alent 90 kg TNT blast.
Repeated simulations using the TNT model in-
dicated that a 5 t AN transport by truck is the best 
choice for both economic and safety reasons. From 
this point of view, the TNT math-model proves to 
be a valuable tool for accurately predicting the risk 
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F i g .  6 	–	 P%	 fatalities	 of	 structures	 (buildings,	 industrial	
plants)	at	various	distances	from	the	explosion	spot.	Note:	The	
circles of iso-parameters present the followings rays: 30 m, 60 
m,	and	90	m,	respectively	(case	of	5	t	AN	explosion).
F i g .  7 	–	 P%	fatalities	of	structures	(buildings,	adjacent	cars,	
etc.)	 at	 30	m	 distance	 from	 the	 explosion	 source,	 for	 various	
amounts of exploded AN
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A b b r e v i a t i o n s  a n d  n o t a t i o n s
a, b, c(i) – Empirical constants in the blast parameter 
functions (given in Table 2)
Ec – Heat of combustion of the explosive com-
pound, kJ kg–1
ETNT – Heat of combustion of TNT, (4437–4765  
kJ kg–1)
ip – Overpressure impulse, Pa s
M – Mass of the explosive compound, kg
p0 – Peak side-on overpressure, kPa
Pf, P% – Probability or percentage of affected recep-
tors at a given distance R, –
R	 – Distance from the explosion location to the 
receptor, m
ta – Arrival time of the shock-wave to the recep-
tor, ms
td – Positive phase duration time of the pulse to 
the receptor, ms
W – Equivalent mass of TNT, kg
Y – Probit variable, –
Z – Scaled analysis range for a given distance R, 
(m kg–1/3)
G r e e k s
h – Unitless empirical explosion efficiency (rec-
ommended 0.05 in literature1)
A b b r e v i a t i o n s
AN – Ammonium nitrate
ANFO – AN mixed with fuel oil
AP – Ammonium perchlorate
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